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This paper deals with macroeconomic aspects of widespread substance abuse with a
reference to illicit drugs as an example. Substance abuse impedes the productivity of the
labor force and reduces economic growth. Workers are either nonusers and therefore fully
productive, a number of whom are employed by the government in drug-control activities,
or users who are only partially productive. Efficient management of the nation’s portfolio
of workers involves eradicating drug use when initial user numbers are lower than a
critical level, but allows user numbers to rise to, and be accommodated at, a stationary
level when initial user numbers exceed a critical level.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The trade and consumption of abusive substances, illicit drugs in particular, is
a serious social problem confronting governments in many countries today. In
some economically poor countries, the use of drugs has been an integral part
of the local culture and has considerably affected the allocation of time, sup-
ply of labor, income, consumption, and investment at the household and ag-
gregate levels. Perhaps in no other country is this most starkly the case than
in Colombia, where the drug industry has acted as a catalyst in delegitimating
the regime, has diminished trust and increased transaction costs, violence, im-
punity, security costs, and has promoted highly speculative investments and capital
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flight (Thoumi, 2002). Brito and Intriligator (1992) portray the drug lords as
Stackelberg leaders who achieve their preferred outcome by appropriate transfers
to the government or the guerrillas. Other notable examples are Yemen, where
addiction, although to a relatively mild drug (Kat), is the norm, and Cambodia
and Afghanistan, where the economic, social, and political affairs in parts of
these countries are dominated by the production, marketing, and consumption
of opium. The trade and consumption of illicit drugs also has had deleterious
effects in Mexico (Chabet, 2002) and Nigeria (Klein, 1999). Illicit drugs also have
adversely affected rich countries. For example, Harwood, Fountain, and Livermore
(1998) estimate the cost of drug abuse and dependence in United States 1992 at
U.S. $98 billion. Using a cost-of-illness approach, Xie, Rehrn, Single, Robson,
and Paul (1998) estimate the economic costs of illicit drug use in Ontario, 1992,
to be Canadian $489 million. The estimate of Collins and Lapsley (1991) for
Australia in 1988 is around Australian $1.6 billion.
Although almost all drugs once were freely available in many countries, re-
cent decades have seen the introduction of progressively tougher domestic and
international restrictions on the traffic and consumption of mind-altering drugs
in particular. Kennally (2001) argues that the prohibition restricts entry, reduces
consumer information, and thus increases the market power of existing traders
who use violence to enforce contracts and produce products of unknown quality.
Hence, increasingly stronger enforcement efforts are likely to put upward pressure
on the full price of illicit drugs to users. This positive relationship between the
full price and enforcement has been incorporated by Behrens, Caulkins, Tragler,
and Feichtinger (1997) and Tragler, Caulkins, and Feichtinger (2001) in optimal
control analyses of the cost-minimizing mix of spending on enforcement and
treatment.
This paper, although not incorporating the price-raising effect of drug-control
explicitly, complements the analyses of Behrens et al. (1997) and Tragler et al.
(2001) by focusing on aggregate production, economic growth, and the debilitating
effects of illicit drugs. More specifically, we focus on the relationships between
disposable national income, the decomposition of the labor force between users and
nonusers, and government control efforts. We construct a macrodynamic optimiza-
tion model to describe rational public investment of effort in controlling the spread
of illicit drugs and their adverse effect on the labor force and economic growth.
Drug control effort is determined so as to maximize the sum of the discounted
disposable national incomes in the presence of fully productive nonusing workers
and less productive drug users. Drug use is modeled as a diffusion process with
user numbers increasing in the existing user population but decreasing in the costly
government control effort. The conceptual framework developed in this paper also
can be used for analyzing the growth-efficient control on other potentially harmful
substances and activities such as alcohol, tobacco, junk-food products, and HIV-
infectious behavior. Therefore, although we refer explicitly to illicit drugs, our
macrodynamic approach is sufficiently general for dealing conceptually with the
abuse of any potentially debilitating substance or activity.1
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The paper continues as follows. Section 2 introduces the building blocks of our
macrodynamic drug-control model in which the nation’s labor force is divided
into nonusing fully productive workers and less productive drug users. Section 3
presents and interprets the rule for drug-control effort that maximizes the present
value of the stream of the net national incomes stemming from the country’s using
and nonusing workers. Two interior equilibriums are identified in Section 4: one
with a low number of users and supported by a high-control effort and the other
with a low-control effort and a high number of users. The properties of these steady
states are analyzed and policy conclusions are drawn. The effects of the model
parameters on the number of users, the control effort, and the level of disposable
national income in each of the two interior steady states are analyzed in Section 5.
Section 6 outlines two extensions of the model. The first extension distinguishes
between two types of drug-control activities: prevention, which we define as law
enforcement and treatment activities that deter initiation; and rehabilitation, in
which long-term dependent users are restored to a drug-free existence. We argue
that convexity of the prevention and rehabilitation cost functions ensures the
optimality of mixed control activities. We show how the growth-efficient mix of
prevention and rehabilitation depends on their relative effectiveness and cost as
well as on the difference between the discount rate and the marginal diffusion
of drug-use and its determinants. The second extension explores the effect on
the growth-efficient control effort of societal conflict between users and nonusers
should the former group become a relatively large proportion of the society. A
brief summary of the paper and a detailed account of its main conclusions are
given in Section 7.
2. BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE MACRO-DYNAMIC
DRUG-CONTROL MODEL
Our macrodynamic model focuses on the relationship between the use of illicit
drugs, labor productivity, aggregate income, and government drug-control effort.
For tractability, we ignore capital, capital accumulation, and technological changes
and assume that labor is the sole factor of production. More specifically, our model
is based on the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (labor-force size and composition): The size of the working-age
population is time invariant and equal to L,2 of which 0 ≤ N(t) ≤ (1 − β)L
people use illicit drugs, hereafter users, where 0 ≤ β < 1 denotes the share of the
population absolutely unsusceptible to illicit drugs.
Assumption 2 (drugs and employment): Lg members of the labor force are drug-
control officers, hereafter controllers, employed by the government and providing
a composite service of prevention and rehabilitation.3 The remaining L − Lg
members are employed in the private sector. Controllers are identical and cannot
be users.
Assumption 3 (drugs and productivity): Illicit drug use reduces productivity.
If the instantaneous output of each of the privately employed L − N(t) − Lg(t)
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nonusers is y then the instantaneous output of a user is:
yn = εy, 0 ≤ ε < 1, (1)
where y is a positive time-invariant scalar, and ε is the relative productivity of a user
with ε = 0 indicating total incapacitation and 0 < ε < 1 partial incapacitation.4
Assumption 4 (drug-proliferation): The net conversion of nonusers and con-
trollers to users is given by the difference between a concave diffusion function
(F) and a linear5 drug-control function (δLg):
Ṅ(t) = F(N(t); (1 − β)L) − δLg(t), (2)
where δ is a positive scalar denoting the instantaneous marginal and average
productivity of each controller in terms of the number of people prevented and
rehabilitated from using illicit drugs.
Our specification of the diffusion function is based on the premise that the use
of narcotics is socially contagious—as the number of users increases, drug using
becomes more socially acceptable.6 Because of innate and acquired differences,
people have varying degrees of resistance to illicit drugs. Drug use spreads gradu-
ally, but in diminishing increments, from highly susceptible people to less suscep-
tible people. Its spread is also moderated by maturation and mortality. Formally,
we assume that F > 0 and F ′′ < 0 for all 0 < N < (1−β)L. Diffusion is positive
as long as the upper bound is not reached, but the marginal diffusion diminishes
as the degree of resistance within the remaining group of nonusers rises and as
the natural attrition of users increases. In particular, we assume F ′ > 0, reflecting
a positive marginal diffusion up to a critical level N∗ < (1 − β)L. Thereafter,
F ′ < 0 reflecting a negative marginal diffusion, which is a result of a dominant
natural attrition effect, and leading to F = 0 when N = (1−β)L. Furthermore, in
order to retain a nonnegative state variable, we assume that F ≤ 0 for all N ≤ 0.
Recalling that F > 0 for all 0 < N < (1 − β)L, then F(0; (1 − β)L) = 0.7
Recalling also that δLg ≥ 0, we merely require that the terminal value of N is
nonnegative (N(∞) ≥ 0) to ensure the nonnegativity of N(t) for every t in the
planning horizon.8 Nevertheless, the case N = 0 has to be considered explicitly
(see Appendix B).
Assumption 5 (control costs): The instantaneous cost of illicit drug control is an
increasing and convex function of Lg(t) comprising a linear part of forgone private
output (y for each controller) and a quadratic part that comprises the private and
social costs stemming from government control. Consistent with Tragler et al.
(2001) and Kennally (2001), we assume these private and social costs increase
in the government’s control effort as drug traders resort to more serious forms
of criminal activity and violence, and drug users face greater uncertainties about
supply and drug quality. In formal terms, the instantaneous costs of control are
depicted as follows:
C(t) = yLg(t) + cLg(t)2, (3)
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where c is the positive coefficient of the marginal private and social costs stem-
ming from the crime, violence, and drug-quality uncertainty accompanying the
government control effort.
Assumption 6 (balanced budget and tax neutrality): At every instance, the gov-
ernment fully finances the control effort by collecting a lump-sum tax. Recalling
that the incomes of all nonusers are identical and the incomes of all users also
are identical but proportionally lower, a progressive tax scheme would subsidise
users at the expense of nonusers and would affect the supply of labor. In contrast,
a lump-sum tax treats users and nonusers equally and does not affect the supply
of labor. Concerns about intra- and intergenerational diffusion of substance abuse
and its debilitating effect on personal and aggregate production motivates nonusers
to bear part of the costs of the government control effort.
3. GROWTH-EFFICIENT DRUG-CONTROL EFFORT
Assumptions 1–3, 5, and 6 imply that the instantaneous disposable national income
(DNI); that is, gross national income net of government spending on, and private
and social costs of, illicit drug-control, is given by:
DNI(t) = [L − (1 − ε)N(t) − Lg(t)]y − cLg(t)2. (4)
Recalling that the size of the working-age population (L) is assumed to be time
invariant, there is no need to divide the DNIs accruing at different instances by
population size for intertemporally assessing national economic benefits. Maxi-
mizing the sum of the discounted instantaneous DNIs is equivalent, in this case, to
maximizing the sum of the discounted per capita DNIs. A growth-efficient drug-
control effort is the trajectory of the number of controllers (Log) that maximizes
the sum of the discounted instantaneous DNIs generated over an infinite planning
horizon subject to the conversion equation of nonusers and controllers to users.
That is,
Log = arg max
∞∫
0
e−ρt {[L − (1 − ε)N(t) − Lg(t)]y − cLg(t)2} dt, (5)
subject to the motion equation (2) and N(∞) ≥ 0, and where ρ is the planner’s
positive fixed rate of time preference. The Hamiltonian associated with this de-
cision problem is concave in the control variable (Lg). The necessary conditions
for maximum and the no-arbitrage rule are derived in Appendix A. Because the
co-state variable λ(t) multiplying [F(N(t); (1 − β)L) − δLg(t)] is nonpositive
and the diffusion function F(N(t); (1 − β)L) is assumed to be concave in N , the
Hamiltonian is nonconcave in N and Mangasarian’s theorem on the sufficiency of
Pontryagin’s maximum-principle conditions is not valid in this case. As speculated
by Clark (1971) and demonstrated by Skiba (1978), Majumdar and Mitra (1980),
and Dechert and Nishimura (1983), the nonconcavity of the Hamiltonian in the
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state variable plays a crucial role in generating unstable steady states and, possibly,
a Dechert-Nishimura-Skiba (DNS) point.
The optimality condition suggests that along the growth-efficient drug-control
path there is an equality between the marginal financial, private, and social costs
of controllers, e−ρt [y + 2cLg(t)], and the value to society of people prevented
and rehabilitated by an additional controller, −δλ(t). By further considering the
adjoint equation, −λ(t)—the present-value shadow cost of users—diminishes at
a rate that is equal to the sum of the marginal diffusion of drugs and the ratio of
the marginal return (MR) on controllers to the marginal costs (C ′) of controllers.
That is,
λ̇(t)
λ(t)
= −F ′(N(t); (1 − β)L) −
MR(Lg(t))︷ ︸︸ ︷
δ(1 − ε)y /
C ′(Lg(t))︷ ︸︸ ︷
(y + 2cLg) . (6)
The evolution of the number of controllers along the growth-efficient path is
given by the following no-arbitrage rule:
L̇og(t) =
UC(Log)︷ ︸︸ ︷
[ρ − F ′(N(t); (1 − β)L)]
C ′(Log)︷ ︸︸ ︷
[y + 2cLog(t)] −
MR(Log)︷ ︸︸ ︷
δ(1 − ε)y
2c︸︷︷︸
C
′′
. (7)
The first term in the numerator of (7) is the instantaneously foregone gross national
income stemming from an additional infinitesimal investment in control. It is
equal to the product of the user cost (UC) of the control capital (namely, the
fully productive people employed as controllers) and the financial, private, and
social costs of employing an additional unit of control capital (a controller). The
user-cost of the control capital (controllers) includes the social planner’s rate of
time preference (presumably the foregone national interest on any dollar spent on
control) but is reduced by the instantaneous “infection” of nonusing workers and
controllers by an additional user, which is positive (negative) up to (beyond) the
critical mass of N∗ users. The second term in the numerator of (7), δ(1 − ε)y,
indicates the marginal return on control capital (controllers). The employment of
a controller increases the number of fully productive nonusers by δ and hence
increases gross national income by δ(1 − ε)y.
The no-arbitrage rule suggests that the government’s efficient employment of
controllers changes during the planning horizon in accordance with the difference
between the foregone gross national income stemming from, and the gross national
income return on, an additional infinitesimal effort invested in drug control. If
the loss of national income from employing an additional controller is greater
(smaller) than the return on a controller, investment in additional control capital
has to be postponed (brought forward). The intertemporal change in the number of
controllers is moderated by the coefficient (2c) of the associated marginal private
and social cost. By adhering to this no-arbitrage rule, the government facilitates the
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construction of a growth-efficient trajectory of the national portfolio of privately
employed inputs comprising a fully effective labor force of L − N(t) − Lg(t)
nonusers and a less effective labor force of N(t) users.
4. PHASE PORTRAIT OF CONTROL AND USE
The system comprising the no-arbitrage rule (7) and the net-loss of fully productive
workers (2) has multiple steady states. By setting L̇g = 0 in (7), the steady-state
levels of control effort satisfy:
Lssg =
δ(1 − ε)y
2c[ρ − F ′(Nss; (1 − β)L)] − y/2c. (8)
Recalling (2), the steady-state levels of control effort also satisfy:
Lssg = F(Nss; (1 − β)L)/δ. (9)
In turn, the steady-state numbers of users satisfy the following equality:
δ(1 − ε)y
2c[ρ − F ′(Nss; (1 − β)L)] − y/2c = F(Nss; (1 − β)L)/δ. (10)
These steady-state levels of control and use are found at the intersections of the
isoclines L̇g = 0 and Ṅ = 0 in the phase-plane diagram. As displayed in Figure 1,
the isocline L̇g = 0 is negatively sloped in the entire phase plane. This is because
of dLg
dN |L̇g= 0 = δ(1 − ε)yF
′′(N;(1 − β)L)
[ρ −F ′(N;(1 −β)L)]2 and F
′′(N; (1 − β)L) < 0. Furthermore, as
dL̇g
dN
= − F ′′C ′/C ′′ > 0, L̇g is positive (negative) and depicted by upward (down-
ward) pointed vertical arrows, in the region to the right (left) of this isocline. The
slope of the isocline Ṅ = 0 is
dLg
dN |Ṅ=0
=
[
F ′(N; (1 − β)L)
δ
]
 0
as N  N∗ and hence this isocline is displayed by an inverted U-shaped
curve. Because dṄ
dLg
= − δ < 0, Ṅ is negative (positive) and depicted by leftward
(rightward) pointed horizontal arrows, in the region above (below) this isocline.
The intersections of these isoclines and the directions of the horizontal and ver-
tical arrows in their vicinity define two unstable steady states (in the positive
quadrant)—an unstable focus SS1 and a saddle point SS2. As SS1 (SS2) is the
steady state with a relatively high (low) control effort and hence a relatively low
(high) number of users, it is not clear which of these steady states is DNI-superior.
Although SS1 is supported by higher control cost, the drug-user intensive SS2 is
associated with a greater loss of labor production capacity. As a marginal solution,
SS0 at the origin also has to be considered.
The depiction of SS1 and SS2 as an unstable focus point and a saddle point,
respectively, bears a resemblance to the phase portrait in the unconstrained model
152 LEVY ET AL.
FIGURE 1. Phase-plane diagram.
of Tragler et al. (2001). The low control and large user number steady state SS2 has
a stable manifold consisting of two arms. One arm leads to SS2 from North-West,
indicating that it is optimal to gradually reduce control effort and allow the number
of users to rise. The other arm converges to SS2 from South-East, revealing that
it is optimal to gradually increase control effort and thereby reduce the number
of users. By contrast, the path leading from North-East to SS0 also has to be
considered as an optimal solution. This implies that it is optimal to increase the
number of controllers at first and, falling below some number of users, the number
of controllers can be reduced. From this kind of phase portrait, an unstable focus
between two optimal long-run steady states, the existence of a DNS point can di-
rectly be concluded (see Feichtinger and Hartl 1986).9 To calculate the DNS point
explicitly, one has to compare the objective functions along the paths leading to the
long-run steady states. The number of users where the objective values coincide
is a DNS point (NDNS in Figure 1). At this point, the policy maker is indifferent
between increasing or decreasing control efforts, as both of them are equally
optimal. If the initial number of users is smaller than NDNS, it is optimal for the
government to eradicate drug use by applying, for a while, a concerted drug-control
effort, which subsequently diminishes as the number of users dwindles.10 This pol-
icy is portrayed by the downward-sloping final segment of the unwinding spiral
leading to the boundary equilibrium N = 0 = Lg (see details in Appendix B).
However, if the initial number of users is larger than NDNS, it is optimal for the
government to gradually reduce effort and allow the number of users to rise and
converge to the level at SS2. There, the cost of controlling any further increase in
the number of users is relatively low because of their small net inflow (recalling
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that F ′′ < 0), which more than compensates for the loss of production capacity
because of the number of users rising to NSS2 .
5. STEADY STATES AND THE EFFECTS OF THE MODEL PARAMETERS
To facilitate the analysis of the effects of the model parameters on the steady states,
the diffusion function (F) is taken to be logistic:
F(t) = αN(t)
[
1 − N(t)
(1 − β)L
]
, (11)
with 0 < α < 1 indicating the intrinsic proliferation rate of drug use. In this case,
the aforementioned no-arbitrage rule and the state-equation are displayed by the
following system of nonlinear differential equations:
L̇g(t) = {{ρ −α[1 − 2N(t)/((1 − β)L(t))]}[y + 2cLg(t)] − δ(1 − ε)y}/2c (12)
Ṅ(t) = αN(t)[1 − N(t)/((1 − β)L(t))] − δLg(t). (13)
By substituting L̇g = 0 = Ṅ into this system,
Lssg =
1
2c
[
δ(1 − ε)y
ρ − α + 2αNss
(1 − β)L
− y
]
, (14)
where Nss satisfies the following polynomial:
2α
(1 − β)LN
3
ss + (ρ − 3α)N2ss − [(δy/c) + (ρ − α)(1 − β)L]Nss
= δ[ρ − α − δ(1 − ε)]y(1 − β)L/2cα. (15)
Consequently, the stationary level of gross national income (GNIss) is given by:
GNIss = [L − (1 − ε)Nss]y, (16)
while the stationary disposable national income (DNIss) is given by:
DNIss =
[
L − (1 − ε)Nss − Lssg
]
y − cLss2g . (17)
A change in any of the model parameters affects the numbers of users and
controllers and, consequently, the disposable national incomes in the steady states.
From (17), DNISS decreases with both NSS and Lssg and is affected, through NSS
and Lssg , by any model parameter γ with an elasticity that is a linear combination
of the elasticities of control and use with respect to that parameter:
ξDNI,γ = −
[(
y + 2cLssg
)
ξLg,γ L
ss
g + (1 − ε)yξN,γ Nss
]/
DNIss. (18)
The directions of the effects of parameter changes on the steady states cannot be
assessed by total differentiation of (14), (15), and (17) (see, for instance, ∂NSS/∂γ
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TABLE 1. The effects on isoclines and steady states of increased parameter values
Parameters→ L ρ δ α β c y ε
Isocline up down up down down down up down
L̇g = 0
Isocline up nil down up down nil nil nil
Ṅ = 0
Lgss1 rises declines ? ? declines declines rises declines
Nss1 ? declines rises declines ? declines rises declines
DNISS1 ? rises ? ? ? rises declines rises
Lgss2 rises declines rises declines declines declines rises declines
Nss2 ? rises declines rises ? rises declines rises
DNISS2 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
in Appendix C). Nevertheless, insights on the effects of a parameter change on the
steady-state levels of the endogenous variables can be gained from the shifts of
the isoclines L̇g = 0 and Ṅ = 0. Table 1 summarizes the effect of an increase in
each parameter on the isoclines and thus on the high- and low-control steady-state
levels of N , Lg , and, in recalling (17), disposable national income. The effects of
all (some) of the model parameters on the low- (high-) control stationary levels of
disposable national income are not clear because of opposing or unclear effects on
the stationary numbers of users and controllers. The high-control stationary level
of disposable national income rises, because of a decline in the numbers of users
and controllers, with the planner’s discount rate, with the gradient of the private
and social marginal cost of control effort and with the relative productivity of
users; but declines, because of an increase in control spending and in the number
of users, with the full-potential personal income.
6. EXTENSIONS
Two extensions of the model are outlined in this section. The first extension
distinguishes, as in Tragler et al. (2001), between two types of control activities—
prevention and rehabilitation—and shows how their efficient levels of imple-
mentation depend on their relative effectiveness and cost. The second extension
incorporates societal costs of disharmony between nonusers and users.
6.1. Efficient Mix of Rehabilitation and Prevention
The government’s effort in controlling the number of users may take different
modes that for simplicity we categorize as rehabilitation and prevention. As indi-
cated in the Introduction, we define prevention as law enforcement and treatment
activities that deter initiation, and rehabilitation as a process in which long-term
dependent users are restored to a drug-free existence. The optimal investment of
effort in rehabilitation and prevention depends on the effectiveness and social cost
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differentials between these activities. The convexity of the private and social costs
of prevention and rehabilitation ensures the optimality of mixed effort as long as
those differentials are not too high in favor of one of the activities.
Letting 0 ≤ φ(t) ≤ 1 be the proportion of Lg(t) invested in rehabilitation at t ,
then the user-nonuser conversion equation (2) and the control cost equation (3)
are modified as follows:
Ṅ(t) = F(N(t); (1 − β)L) − [δrφ(t) + δp(1 − φ(t))]Lg(t) (19)
C(t) = yLg(t) + [crφ(t)2 + cp(1 − φ(t))2]Lg(t)2, (20)
where δr and δp are positive scalars denoting the marginal conversion and the
marginal deterrent of the effort invested in rehabilitation and prevention, respec-
tively; and where cr and cp are positive scalars denoting the coefficients of the
private and social costs associated with investments of effort in rehabilitation and
prevention, respectively.
It is possible that, because of its involuntary nature and its direct and external
effects, prevention leads to higher levels of crime, violence, and drug-quality
uncertainty than does an equal investment of effort in rehabilitation. In this case,
rehabilitation generates lower personal and social costs than prevention for any
equal level of effort cr < cp. Because of the convexity of the private and social
costs, however, there exists a sequence of portfolios of drug-use control activities
with 0 < φ∗(t) < 1 for every t ∈ (0,∞] that is growth-superior to investment in
rehabilitation exclusively (φ(t) = 1) even when, in addition to cr < cp, δr ≥ δp,
as long as cp and δr are not enormously larger than cr and δp, respectively.11
As shown in Appendix D, the trajectory of the mixed effort that maximizes the
sum of the disposable national incomes accruing over an infinite planning horizon
is given by the differential equation:
φ̇(t) − [ρ − F ′(N(t); (1 − β)L) − L̇g(t)/Lg(t)]φ(t)
= −{[ρ − F ′(N(t); (1 − β)L) − L̇g(t)/Lg(t)]cp
+ 0.5(δr − δp)(1 − ε)y/Lg(t)}/(cr + cp). (21)
In turn, the efficient rehabilitation effort share in steady state is:
φSS = cp
cr + cp −
0.5(δp − δr)(1 − ε)y
[ρ − F ′(NSS; (1 − β)L)](cr + cp)LSSg
. (22)
Because LSSg and NSS are endogenous, this expression alone can only be used for
assessing the direct effects of the model parameters on φSS . In this respect, note
the crucial roles of the difference between the discount rate and the stationary
marginal drug-use diffusion and the difference between the marginal effectiveness
of prevention and rehabilitation that lead to the following propositions.
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If the discount rate is greater (smaller) than the stationary marginal drug-use dif-
fusion then the direct effect of the prevention-rehabilitation marginal effectiveness
differential (δp − δr) on φSS is negative (positive).
If the discount rate is greater than the stationary marginal diffusion of drug-use
then the direct effect of the rehabilitation’s private and social cost coefficient cr on
φSS is positive, zero, or negative when δp − δr is greater than, equal to, or smaller
than, [ρ − F ′(NSS; (1 − β)L)]LSSg cp/0.5(1 − ε)y, respectively.
If δp is smaller than δr and the discount rate is smaller than the stationary
marginal diffusion of drug-use, then the direct effect of cr on φSS is positive.
If δp is greater (smaller) than δr then the direct effect of the planner’s rate of time
preference on the stationary share of rehabilitation effort is positive (negative).
If δp is greater than δr and the discount rate is greater than the stationary
marginal drug-use diffusion, then the direct effect of the prevention’s private and
social cost coefficient cp on φSS is positive.
If either (neither) δp is smaller than δr or (nor) the discount rate is smaller than
the stationary marginal drug-use diffusion then the direct effect of personal full
capacity output y on φSS is positive (negative).
If either (neither) δp is smaller than δr or (nor) the discount rate is smaller
than the stationary marginal drug-use diffusion then the direct effect of the users’
relative productivity ε on φSS is negative (positive).
If δp is smaller (greater) than δr and the stationary marginal drug-use diffusion
increases with the size of the vulnerable labor force (1 − β)L (as is the case when
the diffusion function is logistic), then the direct effect of L on φSS is positive
(negative), whereas the direct effect of the drug-use resistant population share β
on φSS is negative (positive).
Finally, if δp = δr then φSS = cp/(cr + cp).
6.2. Societal Disharmony
If substance abuse is sufficiently widespread, tensions between users and nonusers
might arise.12 It is possible that the level of societal disharmony intensifies, and
hence social costs increase, as the difference between the number of nonusers and
controllers and the number of users diminishes. The model is extended to this case.
We assume that the relationship between costs of societal disharmony (CSDH)
and the population share of users conforms to an inverted U-shaped curve.
CSDH(t) = CSDHmax − µ[(N(t)/L) − 0.5]2 (23)
CSDHmax is the maximum societal cost of disharmony that accrues when the
population shares of users and nonusers are equal, and µ is a positive scalar
reflecting the moderating effect of the quadratic distance from equal population
shares on the cost of societal disharmony. This assumption implies, in conjunction
with the assumptions made earlier, that the instantaneous DNI, now the gross
national income net of the financial and social costs of prevention and the costs of
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societal disharmony, is given by:
DNI (t) = [L − (1 − ε)N(t) − Lg(t)]y − cLg(t)2
− [CSDHmax − µ((N(t)/L) − 0.5)2]. (24)
Consequently, the efficient number of controllers is now:
L̂g = arg max
∞∫
0
e−ρt {[L − (1 − ε)N(t) − Lg(t)]y − cLg(t)2
− [SDHmax − µ((N(t)/L) − 0.5)2]} dt, (25)
subject to the motion equation (2). The no-arbitrage rule associated with this
modification is (see details in Appendix E):
˙̂Lg(t)
= [ρ−F
′(N(t);(1−β)L)][y +2cL̂g(t)]−δ{(1−ε)y + (2µ/L)[(N(t)/L)−0.5]}
2c
.
(26)
Because an extra infinitesimal effort in reducing the number of users does not
necessarily reduce the level of societal disharmony, ˙̂Lg  L̇og as N(t)/L  0.5. If
the number of users initially exceeds the number of nonusers, a rise in the control
effort reduces the groups’ size differential and thereby intensifies social tension.
In this case, the efficient increase in control effort is smaller than would be the case
were societal disharmony ignored. Conversely, if the number of nonusers initially
exceeds the number of users, a rise in control effort increases the groups’ size
differential and hence reduces societal tension. In this case, the efficient increase
in control effort is larger than would be the case were societal disharmony ignored.
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In many countries, illicit drug use is a serious problem that reduces the number
of fully productive workers and thereby aggregate output. This paper presents a
dynamic control model—a hybrid of an epidemiological diffusion process and a
macro economic objective—with a special reference to illicit drugs. The model
is generic and also may be applicable to other hazardous substances, to epidemic
control, and to socially undesirable activities such as crime.
The model divides the labor force into fully productive workers who do not
use drugs and only partially productive users, and assumes that the use of drugs
is contagious. In addition to foregone private output, costs are borne by gov-
ernment and society with the provision of control effort. Concerns about intra-
and intergenerational diffusion of substance abuse motivates nonusers to bear
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part of the costs of the government control effort. Efficient management of the
nation’s portfolio of human resources is proposed as a path of drug-control effort
that maximizes the present value of the stream of disposable national incomes.
The efficient level of control varies during the planning horizon in accordance
with the difference between the foregone gross national income stemming from
an additional infinitesimal effort invested in control and the return, in terms of
gross national income, on an additional unit of effort invested in that activity.
The intertemporal change in control effort is moderated by the coefficient of the
associated marginal personal and social costs. The foregone national income is
taken as the product of the user cost of the typical controller and the marginal
financial and social costs of the control effort. The user cost of a controller rises
with the rate of time preference but is moderated by the instantaneous marginal
“infection” of the labor force by users.
The steady states of the system comprising the derived equation of the efficient
change in the control effort and the assumed proliferation equation are found to
be an unstable focus with a high level of control and a low number of users and
a saddle point with a low level of control and a high number of users. Below
a critical number of users it is optimal, from an economic growth perspective,
to eradicate drug use by applying a concerted initial control effort and then by
gradually reducing control. Above that critical number of users it is optimal for
the government to apply a much lower level of initial control and to gradually
reduce control so that the economy converges to the steady state with low-control
effort and a high number of users.
The effects of the model parameters on the high-control and low-control steady-
state numbers of users and controllers, and subsequently on the steady state dis-
posable national income, also were analyzed. The effects of each model parameter
on the level of disposable national income in the low-control steady state are inde-
terminate. In the high-control steady state, disposable national income increases,
because of a decline in the numbers of users and controllers, with the discount
rate, with the gradient of the private and social marginal cost of control effort and
with the relative productivity of users, but declines, because of increases in control
spending and the number of users, with full-potential personal income.
The model was expanded to reflect on the composition of control effort. There
are cost and benefit differences between rehabilitation and prevention. As long as
these differences are not too high in favor of one of the activities, convexity of
the private and social costs of prevention and rehabilitation ensures the optimality
of mixed effort. The propositions concerning the direct effects of drug control’s
benefit and cost coefficients, the personal full capacity output and the users’
relative productivity on the stationary rehabilitation-prevention mix reflected the
crucial roles of the difference between the marginal effectiveness of prevention
and rehabilitation and the difference between the discount rate and the stationary
marginal diffusion of drug use.
The model also was expanded to incorporate tension between users and
nonusers. It was shown that if the number of users initially exceeds the number of
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nonusers, raising the control effort diminishes the groups’ size differential and, in
turn, intensifies societal tension. In this case, the efficient rise in control effort is
smaller than would be the case were societal tension ignored. Conversely, when
initially the number of nonusers exceeds the number of users, raising the control
effort increases the groups’ size differential and subsequently reduces the level of
societal tension. In this case, the efficient rise in control effort is larger than would
be the case were societal disharmony ignored.
NOTES
1. Although the analysis refers to substance abuse, the framework developed is also applicable
to schooling (where users are high school drop-outs and controllers are teachers), crime (where users
are criminals and controllers are police officers) and public health management (where users are sick
people and controllers are physicians).
2. A time-invariant population size is also assumed in Skiba’s (1978) optimal growth analysis.
In this case, the greater the aggregate output at any given moment, the greater the benefits gained by
society.
3. The extension of the model in Section 6 divides Lg into a group of controllers providing
rehabilitation and a group of controllers engaged in prevention.
4. In an intertemporal analysis of an individual’s production and substance abuse it is reasonable to
assume that the debilitating effect of a constant amount of drug consumption is likely to be decreasing:
ε̇ > 0 as a user becomes gradually accustomed to the adverse effects of drugs and develops some
level of tolerance to those effects. However, in an intertemporal analysis of national production and
substance abuse, such as the present one, 1 − ε denotes the average loss of production capacity within
the group of users. Because of entry and exit, the composition of this group changes over time. Entry of
new users is driven by curiosity, temptation, conformity to peers’ expectations, failure, and loss. Exit
is a result of attrition—death of heavy and old users—and also rehabilitation and maturation of others.
Because the membership in the group of users changes continually it is difficult to justify ε̇ > 0 or
ε̇ < 0. Moreover, because of tolerance, the amount and frequency of drug consumption among veteran
users are likely to be greater than among newly initiated users. The increased drug consumption by
dependent users offsets the positive effect of their higher tolerance to the adverse effects of drugs on
their productivity. Therefore, a conservative assumption of time in variant average loss of personal
productivity within the group of users is made.
5. An alternative concave specification—R(Lg), R′ > 0, R′′ < 0—reflecting diminishing mar-
ginal control requires −λ(t)R′′(Lg(t)) < 2c for an interior solution to the maximization problem
described in Section 3 to exist, where c is the private and social cost coefficient indicated in assumption
5 and λ is the co-state variable of the maximization problem’s Hamiltonian. It also is possible that the
marginal control effort depends on the number of users (R′(Lg; N)). However, the effect of N on the
marginal control effort is not clear a priori. On the one hand, the greater the number of users, the easier
the “catch.” On the other hand, a larger number of users might be associated with a greater resistance
to governmental control effort.
6. There exists a considerable literature that models illicit drug use as a socially contagious activity.
Diffusion models have had considerable success in describing the initial introduction and subsequent
spread of new substances such as illicit drugs. See Ferrence (2001) for a review.
7. Note that the logistic diffusion function used in Section 4, F(t) = αN(t)[1−N(t)/((1 − β)L)]
with 0 < α < 1 denoting the intrinsic diffusion rate N∗ = 0.5(1 − β)L, satisfies these assumptions.
8. The underlying rationale is that once N reaches zero, it cannot increase thereafter. If N were
to become negative, it could not increase later to satisfy the terminal nonnegativity requirement. Thus,
our terminal nonnegativity restriction assures nonnegativity of N throughout.
9. The existence of a DNS point in the present framework is similar to the one in the special case
described by Tragler et al. (2001) of unconstrained control budget and slowly diminishing returns on
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treatment, and to the critical point in the analogous case of efficient management of renewable natural
resources with a convex-concave growth function in the state variable proposed by Clark (1971, 1976)
and proven by Majumdar and Mitra (1980).
10. It is unlikely in reality for illicit drug use to be completely eliminated because as user numbers
dwindle, it becomes increasingly difficult for officials to identify remaining users. It is also difficult
to envisage government employing the control effort required for eliminating a problem that is yet to
become apparent.
11. See discussion of the relative effectiveness of prevention and rehabilitation in Gerstein,
Johnson, Harwood, Fountain, Suter, and Malloy (1994), Rydell, Caulkins, and Everingham (1996),
Caulkins, Rydell, Schwabe, and Chiese (1997), and Crane, Rivolo, and Comfort (1997).
12. In the case of AIDS, there exists tension between infected and noninfected people, and
incidences of atrocities have been reported.
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York: Walter de Gruyter.
Gerstein, Dean R., Robert A. Johnson, Henrick J. Harwood, Douglas Fountain, Natalie Suter, and
Kay Malloy (1994) Evaluating Recovery Services: The California Drug and Alcohol Treatment
Assessment. Chicago IL and Lewin-VHI Fairfax, VA: National Opinion Research Center.
Harwood, Henrick J., Douglas Fountain, and Gina Livermore (1998) The Economic Costs of Alcohol
and Drug Abuse in the United States—1992. Rockville, MD: National Institutes of Health.
Kamien, Morton I. and Nancy L. Schwartz (1991) Dynamic Optimization, 2nd Ed. Amsterdam: North-
Holland.
Kennally, Gerald (2001) Regulating the trade in recreational drugs. European Journal of Law and
Economics 11(1), 69–82.
Klein, Axel (1999) Nigeria and the drugs war. Review of African Political Economy 26(79), 51–73.
Majumdar, Makul and Tapan Mitra (1980) On Optimal Exploitation of a Renewable Resources in a
Non-Convex Environment and the Minimum Safe Standard of Conservation. Working paper no. 223,
Cornell University.
MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE 161
Rydell, C. Peter, Jonathon P. Caulkins, and Susan S. Everingham (1996) Enforcement or treatment:
modelling the relative efficacy of alternatives for controlling cocaine. Operations Research 44(6),
687–695.
Skiba, A.K. (1978) Optimal growth with a convex-concave production function. Econometrica 46(3),
527–539.
Tragler, Gernot, Jonathon P. Caulkins, and Gustav Feichtinger (2001) Optimal dynamic allocation of
treatment and enforcement in illicit drug control. Operations Research 49(3), 352–362.
Thoumi, Francisco (2002) Illegal drugs in Colombia: from illegal economic boom to social crisis.
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 582, 102–116.
Xie, Xiaodi, Jurgen Rehrn, Eric Single, Lynda Robson, and Josh Paul (1998) The economic costs of
illicit drug use in Ontario: 1992. Health Economics 7(1), 81–85.
APPENDIX A
THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS AND THE NO-ARBITRAGE RULE
The (present value) Hamiltonian associated with (5) and (2) is
H(t) = e−ρt {[L − (1 − ε)N(t) − Lg(t)]y − cLg(t)2} + λ(t)[F(N(t);
(1 − β)L) − δLg(t)]. (A1)
The necessary conditions for maximum are:
λ̇(t) = −∂H(t)
∂N(t)
= e−ρt [(1 − ε)y] − λ(t)F ′(N(t); (1 − β)L) (A2)
∂H(t)
∂Lg(t)
= −e−ρt [y + 2cLg(t)] − δλ(t) = 0, (A3)
(2) and the transversality condition limt→∞ λ(t)N(t) = 0.
(6) is obtained by dividing both sides of (A2) by λ and considering that by virtue of (A3)
λ(t) = −eρt [y + 2cLg(t)]/δ. The no-arbitrage rule (7) is obtained by differentiating the
optimality condition (A3) with respect to t (singular control), substituting the information
contained in conditions (A2) and (A3) for λ̇ and λ, respectively, multiplying both sides by
eρt/2c and rearranging terms. It also can be obtained by using Euler equation.
APPENDIX B
THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE STATE CONSTRAINT N(t) ≥ 0
Considering (A1), the Lagrangian (t) for the state constraint N(t) ≥ 0 becomes
(t) = H(t) + ν(t)N(t). (B1)
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Following Kamien and Schwartz (1991, p. 230), the necessary optimality conditions are:
Lg (t) = −e−ρty − 2cLg(t) − δλ(t) = 0 (B2)
λ̇(t) = − ∂(t)
∂N(t)
= e−ρt (1 − ε)y − λ(t)F ′(N(t); (1 − β)L) − ν(t) (B3)
ν(t) ≥ 0 (B4)
N(t)ν(t) = 0. (B5)
Therefore, the constrained canonical system is:
Ṅ(t) = −δLg(t) (B6)
λ̇(t) = e−ρt (1 − ε)y − λ(t)F ′(0; (1 − β)L) − ν(t). (B7)
Furthermore, as the Legendre-Clebsh condition LgLg (t) = −2c < 0 is satisfied it is
assured that the costate λ(t) and control Lg(t) are continuous at switching points where
the state constraint becomes active (see, for example, Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986). From
(B6) it can be seen that the origin in the state control space is a candidate for an optimal
solution. To prove (B4) we get from (B2), Lg = 0 and because of the continuity of the
costate variable at the switching time t0:
λ(t) = −e−ρty/δ for t ≥ t0. (B8)
Setting now λ̇(t) = 0 and substituting (B8) the following equality for ν(t) with t ≥ t0
holds.
ν(t) = e−ρty
(
1 − ε + F
′(0; (1 − β)L)
δ
)
. (B9)
As ε < 1, F ′(N(t); (1 − β)L) > 0, y > 0 and δ > 0 have been assumed, this proves
ν(t) > 0 for t ≥ t0. Hence, N = 0 = Lg satisfies the necessary optimality conditions.
APPENDIX C
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE MODEL PARAMETERS
The effects of changes in L, ρ, δ, α, β, c, y, and ε on Nss are as follows:
dNss
dL
=
2αN 3ss
(1 − β)L2 + (ρ − α)(1 − β)Nss +
δ[ρ − α − δ(1 − ε)]y(1 − β)
2cα
6αN 2ss
(1 − β)L + 2(ρ − 3α)Nss − (δy/c) − (ρ − α)(1 − β)L
(C1)
dNss
dρ
= (1 − β)L[Nss + δy/2cα] − N
2
ss
6αN 2ss
(1 − β)L + 2(ρ − 3α)Nss − (δy/c) − (ρ − α)(1 − β)L
(C2)
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dNss
dδ
= [yNss + (ρ − α − 2δ)(1 − β)L/2α]/c
6αN 2ss
(1 − β)L + 2(ρ − 3α)Nss − (δy/c) − (ρ − α)(1 − β)L
(C3)
dNss
dα
= 3N
2
ss −
{[
2N3ss/(1 − β)L
] + (1 − β)L [Nss + δ(1 − β)L(yα − (ρ − α − δ(1 − ε))y)/2cα2]}
6αN2ss
(1 − β)L + 2(ρ − 3α)Nss − (δy/c) − (ρ − α)(1 − β)L
(C4)
dNss
dβ
=
−
(
2αN 3ss
(1 − β)2L + (ρ − α)LNss +
δL{[ρ − α − δ(1 − ε)]y}
2cα
)
6αN 2ss
(1 − β)L + 2(ρ − 3α)Nss − (δy/c) − (ρ − α)(1 − β)L
(C5)
dNss
dc
= −δ[yNss + (ρ − α − δ(1 − ε))y(1 − β)L/2α]/c
2
6αN 2ss
(1 − β)L + 2(ρ − 3α)Nss − (δy/c) − (ρ − α)(1 − β)L
(C6)
dNss
dy
= (δ/c){Nss + [ρ − α − δ(1 − ε)](1 − β)L/2α}
6αN 2ss
(1 − β)L + 2(ρ − 3α)Nss − (δy/c) − (ρ − α)(1 − β)L
(C7)
dNss
d(1 − ε) =
−δ2y(1 − β)L/2cα
6αN 2ss
(1 − β)L + 2(ρ − 3α)Nss − (δy/c) − (ρ − α)(1 − β)L
. (C8)
APPENDIX D
THE NO-ARBITRAGE RULE OF EQUATION (21)
The decision problem in Section 6 is:
max
{φ,Lg }
∞∫
0
e−ρt {[L − (1 − ε)N(t) − Lg(t)]y − [crφ(t)2 + cp(1 − φ(t))2]Lg(t)2} dt (D1)
subject to the state equation (19) and N(∞) ≥ 0. The Hamiltonian associated with this
problem is
H(t) = e−ρt {[L − (1 − ε)N(t) − Lg(t)]y − [crφ(t)2 + cp(1 − φ(t))2]Lg(t)2}
+ λ(t){F(N(t), (1 − β)L) − [δrφ(t) + δp(1 − φ(t))]Lg(t)} (D2)
The necessary conditions for maximum are
λ̇(t) = −∂H(t)
∂N(t)
= e−ρt (1 − ε)y − λ(t)F ′(N(t); (1 − β)L) (D3)
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∂H(t)
∂φ
= −2e−ρt [(cr + cp)φ(t) − cp]Lg(t)2 − λ(t)(δr − δp)Lg(t) = 0 (D4)
∂H(t)
∂Lg(t)
= −e−ρt {y + 2[crφ2 + cp(1 − φ)2]Lg} − λ[δrφ + δp(1 − φ)] = 0. (D5)
(21) is obtained by dividing both side of (D4) by Lg , differentiating with respect to t ,
substituting the right-hand side of (D3) for λ̇ and the expression of λ from (D4), and
rearranging terms.
APPENDIX E
THE NO-ARBITRAGE RULE OF EQUATION (26)
The Hamiltonian associated with this decision problem is
H(t) = e−ρt {[L − (1 − ε)N(t)]y − C(Lg(t)) − [CSDHmax − µ((N(t)/L) − 0.5)2]}
+ λ(t)[F(N(t); (1 − β)L) − δLg(t)]. (E1)
The necessary conditions for maximum are
λ̇(t) = −∂H(t)
∂N(t)
= e−ρt {(1−ε)y+(2µ/L)[((N(t))/L)−0.5]}− λ(t)F ′(N(t); (1−β)L),
(E2)
∂H(t)
∂Lg(t)
= −e−ρtC ′(Lg(t)) − δλ(t) = 0, (E3)
(2) and the transversality condition limt→∞ λ(t)N(t) = 0. The no-arbitrage rule (26) is
obtained by differentiating the optimality condition (E3) with respect to t (singular control),
substituting the information contained in conditions (E2) and (E3) for λ̇ and λ, respectively,
multiplying both sides by eρt /C ′′(Lg(t)) and rearranging terms.
